论文精选73°

AgentAudit:AI智能体全生命周期信任评估框架

AgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents

精选理由

AgentAudit能全面评估AI智能体表现,发现任务完成表现相似但信任度差异巨大的模型,比传统通过/失败基准更精准。

AgentAudit是一个开放可扩展的AI智能体评估框架,全面评估智能体从规划到执行的完整流程。该框架从十个维度评估智能体表现,包括指令完整性、规划器、记忆、工具选择等。研究团队评估了五种语言模型,Claude Sonnet 5和GPT-5获得最高综合信任分数(95.1和80.6),而Sarvam 105B、Llama 3.3 70B和Gemini 2.5 Flash得分较低(57.6、45.7和22.6)。

原文 · arXiv: OpenAI

AgentAudit: An Open, Extensible Framework for Full-Lifecycle Trust Evaluation of AI Agents

Existing evaluation frameworks mostly assess only one part of AI agents, such as task completion (AgentBench) or security robustness (AgentDojo, ASB), rather than the complete pipeline of planning, tool selection, tool execution, memory and reasoning. Failures can occur at any stage, yet existing benchmarks rarely identify their precise source. AgentAudit evaluates the entire execution trace across ten capability, grounding, security and behavioural dimensions, namely instruction integrity, planner, memory, tool selection, tool invocation, tool correctness, alignment, tool faithfulness, security and execution integrity, combined with behavioural classification and failure attribution to pinpoint the exact stage responsible for an observed failure. AgentAudit can evaluate any LLM-based AI agent, since it attaches to the agent instead of replacing it. It reads only the recorded execution trace and does not interfere with how the agent runs, so it places no constraint on the agent's internal implementation. We evaluate five language models (OpenAI GPT-5, Claude Sonnet 5, Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash) across nine capability and adversarial tasks. Claude Sonnet 5 and GPT-5 obtain the highest mean Composite Trust Scores (95.1 and 80.6 out of 100, respectively), while Sarvam 105B, Llama 3.3 70B and Gemini 2.5 Flash trail substantially (57.6, 45.7 and 22.6). All traces were scored by a single fixed judge model, which was itself one of the evaluated models, a limitation discussed in Section VII.E. More importantly, models with similar task-completion behaviour can diverge sharply in trustworthiness, as several non-frontier models are repeatedly classified Unsafe_Compliance on adversarial tasks rather than merely failing them, a distinction that pass/fail benchmarks cannot surface.