研究:Abliteration 在 Qwen3.8、Gemma 4 等新模型上并非普遍变难
Is Abliteration Getting Harder? Not Uniformly: Refusal Removal by Direction-Based Ablation and ARA in Heretic on the Qwen3.8, Gemma 4, Olmo 3.1 and Mistral Small 3.2 LLMs Versus Their Predecessors
想了解开源模型去审查(abliteration)现状的可以看这篇:作者把 Qwen、Gemma、OLMo、Mistral 五对新旧模型在 Heretic 2.0 里跑了同一套对比,发现有的新模型更难绕过,有的反而更容易。做安全评估或权重编辑的人值得注意它的方法论提醒:单次实验结论可能不成立。
arXiv 论文(2611.17846)测试了方向消融与 ARA 两种 abliteration 方法在五组开源模型上的失效变化。作者在 Heretic 2.0 中用相同提示词、KL 散度上限和搜索预算,编辑了 Qwen2.5-32B/Qwen3.8-27B、Gemma-2-27B/Gemma-4-31B、OLMo-2-32B/Olmo-3.1-32B、Mistral-Small-2409/Mistral-Small-3.2、Qwen2.5-7B/Qwen3.5-4B 五对新旧模型。
实验用 WildGuard 作为自动裁判,在 972 条留出有害提示(来自 JailbreakBench、XSTest、StrongREJECT、HarmBench 和作者自建的恶意代码集)上统计仍拒绝的比例。结果差异很大:方向消融后新模型拒绝率变化为 -1 到 +37 个百分点,ARA 为 -26 到 +34,且 I² 统计显示组间异质性达 20-80%。Gemma 上的效果增长主要来自恶意代码集,在公开基准上反而逆转。
论文结论是:新模型是否更难去除拒绝行为取决于具体模型对、方法和预算,而非代际本身;只审计单一模型对、方法或提示来源的研究可能得出完全相反的结论。这对做安全评估和权重编辑的从业者意味着单点实验不可靠。
Is Abliteration Getting Harder? Not Uniformly: Refusal Removal by Direction-Based Ablation and ARA in Heretic on the Qwen3.8, Gemma 4, Olmo 3.1 and Mistral Small 3.2 LLMs Versus Their Predecessors
Abliteration, a fine-tuning-free weight edit, removes refusal from open-weight large language models (LLMs). The developer of Arbitrary-Rank Ablation (ARA), an optimisation-based variant, reports that direction-based abliteration, which ablates a refusal direction, increasingly fails on newer models. On five release pairs, refusal removal did not become uniformly harder. Qwen2.5-32B and Qwen3.8-27B, Gemma-2-27B and Gemma-4-31B, OLMo-2-32B and Olmo-3.1-32B, Mistral-Small-2409 and Mistral-Small-3.2, and Qwen2.5-7B and Qwen3.5-4B were edited in Heretic 2.0 by three or four direction-based methods (difference-in-means, MPOA, SOM and, on the small pair, J-space) and ARA under the same prompts, nominal search budget, first-token KL divergence cap and selection rule; removal counted as harder when the automatic WildGuard judge found more of 972 held-out harmful prompts (JailbreakBench, XSTest, StrongREJECT, HarmBench and an author-compiled malicious-code bank) still refused. After direction-based removal, newer releases retained -1 to +37 percentage points more refusal, and after ARA -26 to +34. With run-to-run variance included, between-pair heterogeneity of the direction-based effect ranged from high to low with the scale and variance model (I^2 20-80%). ARA lost less effectiveness than direction-based methods in Gemma and OLMo and more in Qwen; each verdict rests on one ARA run, and some changed with the divergence budget or variance model. In Gemma the direction-based increase came from the malicious-code bank and reversed on public sets. Contrary to prediction, keyword counts at the tool's window did not undercount judged refusal on average, but differed by a mean 7 points per model. Audits of a single pair, method or prompt source can reach opposite conclusions. Whether a newer model resisted removal depended on the release pair, method and budget, not on generation alone.
本条情报归属 AITOP「论文」核心追踪栏目。在跨区域产业观察坐标中,该动态直接关联「AI 开发者工具链、Coding Agent 与工程化实践」研究主线,反映出当前技术演进与商业落地的最新风向。涉及核心实体与技术议题包括:Abliteration、Qwen3.8、Gemma 4、Heretic,读者可通过下方标签进入对应专题页查阅历史脉络与关联对比。
信源核验说明:本文原始线索采编自「arXiv cs.AI」(@Richard J. Young),经 AITOP 多维评分管线结构化提炼。