arXiv 论文用 Stackelberg 博弈分析 AI 安全防御的充分条件

Defensive Sufficiency in a Stackelberg Model of AI Security

Feedback from automated testing, human red teaming, and incident response can strengthen an AI system's defenses when discovered failures lead to effective repairs. We study when this feedback process provides sufficient protection and when investing in it is economically worthwhile. We begin by showing that an attack surface composed of finite number of inputs is defended with probability 1 if every unresolved attack has a persistent chance of discovery, repairs are effective, and subsequent updates preserve earlier protection. We derive completion-time bounds and extend the analysis to growing attack surfaces, repairs that generalize across related attacks, and multiple discovery mechanisms. These results distinguish eventual protection against each fixed attack from complete protection at a single time. We then formulate a defender-led Stackelberg game in which the defender invests in proactive discovery and reactive repair, anticipating the attacker's choice of search effort. We characterize the least-cost allocation that deters attack and the equilibrium regimes in which the defender funds neither capability, one capability, or both. Numerical experiments illustrate these regimes and show how faster repair can reduce compromise duration without reducing compromise probability.unified theory of performance limits in generative language models.